Climate Governance in China: Using the "Iron Hand" by Lin, JSW
Title Climate Governance in China: Using the "Iron Hand"
Author(s) Lin, JSW
Citation
International Workshop on Climate Change and Local
Government Law, Vancouver, Canada, 22-23 October 2011. In
Benjamin J. Richardson (Ed.), Local Climate Change Law:
Environmental Regulation in Cities and Other Localities.
Cheltenham, U.K. ; Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2012, p. 300-324
Issued Date 2012
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/144482
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1967830
This chapter will be published in Benjamin J. Richardson (ed.), Local Climate 
Change Law: Environmental Regulation in Cities and Other Localities (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2012). 
 
Climate Governance in China: Using the “Iron Hand” 
Jolene Lin 
 
 
“Premier Wen Jiabao on Wednesday vowed to realize the country’s green 
goal to cut energy intensity by 20 percent between 2006 and 2010. In a 
nationwide video and teleconference, Wen told governments at all levels 
to work with an ‘iron hand’ to eliminate inefficient enterprises.”1  
 
This chapter analyses the Chinese climate governance landscape that has 
emerged over the past decade, and focuses on the role of local governments. The 
central argument is that climate governance in China is predominantly top-down and 
highly bureaucratic in nature. Local initiatives to address climate change have tended 
to be responses to policy directions and performance targets imposed from the central 
government in Beijing. However, there is an interesting transnational dynamic to local 
climate governance in China as many local governments have embraced the financial 
opportunities afforded by the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). Alongside environmental aid projects funded by multilateral agencies and 
private foundations, there is considerable climate mitigation activity at the local level 
because of the CDM.  
 
Part I of this chapter is a brief primer on China’s recent greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions patterns and the central government’s climate change policy. Part II 
examines the role played by local authorities in addressing climate change in China. 
They have acted on climate change mainly in response to policy directions issued by 
the central government. While there is considerable leeway for policy innovation at 
the local level, there are few, if any, incentives for local officials to address climate 
change; however, the central government has sought to correct this situation by 
invoking the cadre system (gangwei zerenzhi). As a result of framing climate change 
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as an issue of energy and economic restructuring above all else, climate mitigation has 
received more attention than adaptation even though many regions are highly 
vulnerable to flood risks, drought and other impacts related to global warming. Part 
III argues that local governments in China have responded positively to the incentives 
created by the CDM to host GHG reduction projects. This has had positive spill-over 
effects as CDM projects often offer co-benefits such as improving air quality (through 
fuel switching from coal to wind, for example). From a theoretical perspective, the 
interaction between Chinese local authorities and multilateral agencies and foreign 
investors/purchasers is an interesting example of how an international legal 
instrument can empower local governments to act on global environmental problems. 
Part IV concludes with some observations about the future of climate governance in 
China and the role of local governments.  
 
Part I: Reducing the Carbon Footprint with a Focus on Energy Security  
 
This section provides some background on China’s climate policy. The 
discussion is mostly on the central government’s policy and thinking on the issue, 
which is important as local policy is heavily influenced by Beijing and, in fact, 
dictated by Beijing in many instances. The brief sketch of the key objectives of the 
current administration led by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (2003-present) - economic 
development, poverty alleviation and reducing the widening income gap – informs the 
reader of the broader context in which climate change policy in China has developed.  
 
Quick Snapshot  
 
China has reportedly surpassed the United States as the world’s largest GHG 
emitter.2 Annual carbon dioxide emissions from China grew by about four billion 
tonnes between 1992 and 2007.3 More than 70% of this increase occurred between 
2002 and 2007, but does not simply reflect higher gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth rates during this period. Possible explanations include increased exports 
following China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, but a recent study 
indicates that the emissions growth between 2002 and 2007 is largely the result of 
capital investments to meet growing demand for roads, houses and other 
                                                 
2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/International Energy Agency, 
2007, World Energy Outlook 2007: India and China Insights; Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD)/International Energy Agency, 2010, World Energy Outlook 2010.  
3 Jan Christoph Minx et al, “A ‘Carbonizing’ Dragon: China’s fast growing CO2 emissions revisited” 
(2011) Environmental Science and Technology 9144. 
infrastructure.4 Unlike developed countries, where emissions from household 
consumption usually make up the lion’s share across energy demand categories, 
households in China were responsible for only 25% of total carbon dioxide emissions 
in 2007.5 However, the direct and indirect emissions of urban households are far 
greater than those of rural households. Household emissions are likely to rise as 
Chinese society continues to rapidly urbanize. In short, China’s high level of 
emissions is largely attributable to manufacturing goods for export, building 
infrastructure for its population of over one billion people, and to a lesser degree, 
changing demographic patterns of increasing urbanization and affluence.  
 
However, while China’s GHG emissions in absolute terms are high for an 
individual country, on a per capita basis its emissions remain relatively much lower. 
Carbon dioxide emissions per capita have increased in China from 2.2 tonne per 
capita in 1990 to 6.8 tonne per capita in 2010.6 This is a modest figure compared to 
the per capita emissions in the European Union (EU-27) and the US of 8.1 tonne per 
capita and 16.9 tonne per capita in 2010 respectively.7 There is, however, great 
concern that per capita emissions in China are quickly approaching levels found in 
Kyoto Protocol Annex I countries. It is predicted that if current trends in emissions by 
China and the industrialised countries continue for the next seven years, China will 
overtake the US by 2017 as highest per capita emitter.8 Mr. Xie Zhenhua, vice chair 
of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) which is in charge of 
climate policy in China, has publicly affirmed China’s commitment to preventing its 
per capita emissions from reaching the levels seen in the US.9 
                                                 
4 Ibid, 9151. 
5 Ibid, 9151; also see Anna Korppoo & Alex Luta (eds), ‘Towards a new climate regime?: Views of 
China, India, Japan, Russia and the United States on the road to Copenhagen’, The Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs <www.upi-fiia.fi> accessed 10 September 2011, 34, wherein the authors point out 
that it is “[a] popular misconception …that it is the rapid rise in private vehicles and household 
consumption that is spurring China’s increase in energy consumption. This is the probable scenario in 
the future, but it is not the case at present”.  
6 Olivier, J.G.J., Janssens-Maenhout, G., Peters, J.A.H.W. & J. Wilson (2011), ‘Long-term trend in 
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Commission’s Joint Research Centre, 2011 report 
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on 21 November 2011; page 14. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid, 12.  
9 Richard Black, “China ‘won’t follow US’ on carbon emissions” BBC News (25 October 2011) 
 
Coal is the primary fuel used to generate electricity. In 2009, electricity 
generated from coal combustion accounted for 95.2% of total energy generation while 
electricity generated from oil and natural gas accounted for 0.6% and 0.2% 
respectively.10 The use of coal to generate electricity is a major source of GHG 
emissions and conventional air pollution. Twenty out of thirty of the world’s most 
polluted cities are in China.11 
 
Energy, Economy and Climate Change  
 
The Chinese leadership has come to recognize that it is no longer tenable to say 
that tackling climate change is a purely developed country issue now that China is the 
world’s largest consumer of energy and carbon dioxide emitter. There is also keen 
awareness of China’s vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.12 Thus, in the 
past ten years, there have been marked changes in the Chinese government’s stance 
towards climate change both in the international arena and domestically.13 While 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-15444858> accessed 21 November 2011. 
10 Climate Policy Initiative at Tsinghua, Review of Low Carbon Development in China: 2010 Report, 
page 3.  
11 World Bank, ‘China Quick Facts’  
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/CHINAE
XTN/0,,contentMDK:20680895~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:318950,00.html> 
accessed 3 November 2011 ; Shi Jiangtao, ‘Beijing in top 10 – of dirtiest capitals’ South China 
Morning Post (Hong Kong, 28 September 2011) A1. 
12 The National Climate Change Programme (“NCCP”) contains a comprehensive documentation of 
the various projected impacts of climate change on the country. They include ‘increased instability in 
agricultural production’ and decreased yields in wheat, rice and maize; a nearly thirty percent reduction 
by 2050 in the size of the glaciers in western China that are an important source of drinking water, 
threats to biodiversity, including a conclusion that ‘the giant panda [and other native creatures] are 
likely to be greatly affected’; substantial droughts in the already-arid northern provinces, a sea level 
rise along the coast; more frequent typhoons and storm surges; more frequent and intense heat waves; 
National Development and Reform Commission, ‘China’s National Climate Change Programme’ 
(National Development and Reform Commission People’s Republic of China), June 2007) 
<www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File188.pdf> accessed 3 November 2011, pages 
16-17.  
13 ‘The Chinese leadership has changed its views on climate change completely in the last ten years’; 
Professor Lord Anthony Giddens, Opening Keynote Address, “Navigating the New Green Economy” 
conference, 23-24 May 2011, London.  
adhering to its long-held views that the developed countries ought to lead 
international action (in accordance with the principle of common-but-differentiated 
responsibility), and that China is not economically ready to take on legally binding 
GHG emissions reduction targets at the international level, the Chinese leadership has 
also taken strides within the vast country to address climate change.14  
 
These attitudinal changes must be understood within the wider context of the 
Chinese leadership’s priority on economic development and related concerns of 
energy security. Economic progress is standard policy fare for all governments but in 
China, it is not merely a matter of policy. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has 
pegged its political future on ‘performance legitimacy’, that is, its rein on power is 
justified because it can provide faster growth and higher standards of living than any 
other form of government.15 In accordance with this view, the government cannot 
afford to let the pace of economic development falter because of the unthinkable 
political repercussions.16 The Chinese preoccupation with economic growth as the 
basis of state legitimacy is certainly not unique to China – many scholars have 
identified a similar impetus to the political legitimacy of Western governments17 – 
but in China, the connection between material prosperity and political hegemony 
                                                 
14 See Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Oxford 
University Press 2006); Ellen Hey, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum 
(ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2009). For 
articulation of China’s adherence to the common-but-differentiated responsibility principle, see Section 
3.2 of the NCCP. At the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties held in Copenhagen in December 2009, 
China maintained its traditional position against legally binding emission reduction targets; see 
Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other 
International Organizations in Switzerland, Implementation of the Bali Roadmap- China’s Position on 
the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (20 May 2009) 
<www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t564324.htm> accessed 18 September 2011. 
15 See Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (W.W. Norton & 
Company 1995). 
16 André Laliberté and Marc Lanteigne, ‘The issue of challenges to the legitimacy of CCP rule’ in 
André Laliberté and Marc Lanteigne (eds), The Chinese Party­State in the 21st Century: Adaptation 
and the Reinvention of Legitimacy (Routledge 2008) provides a succinct overview of this viewpoint as 
well as the argument that while economic growth is the government’s key policy priority, growth does 
not automatically translate into increased legitimacy. The government is actively seeking means to 
cultivate other sources of legitimacy such as nationalism. 
17  See eg, Jurgen Habermas, The Legitimation Crisis (Beacon Press 1975), Claus Offe, 
Contradictions of the Welfare State (MIT Press 1984). 
appears to be much closer. 
 
Although the current Hu-Wen administration has sought to portray itself as more 
sympathetic to the plight of the poor and sensitive to social needs such as healthcare 
and environmental protection, the growth-oriented policies of Hu’s predecessor, Jiang 
Zemin, remain central to the CCP’s governing strategy albeit pursued with greater 
moderation.18 Hu’s concept of ‘the Scientific Outlook on Development’, which took 
centre stage at the National People’s Congress meeting in March 2004, calls on the 
party to view economic development as the foremost priority which is to be pursued 
as part of a more balanced, sustainable and ‘people-centric’ course of development.19 
Accordingly, reducing energy consumption and environmental pollution are also 
important policy objectives. Commentators argue, however, that local government 
officials are likely to be able to circumvent tougher calls from Beijing to address 
environmental issues by claiming that economic development takes priority in 
accordance with Hu’s concept.20 Further, as will be discussed below, the post-1978 
growth-centric policies have also engendered ‘Two Chinas’, one wealthy and one still 
struggling with poverty, which has significant bearing on how much power and 
resources local governments in some regions have to address climate change.21  
                                                 
18 June Teufel Dreyer, China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition (5th edn, Pearson 
Education Inc 2006) 134-135; Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (3rd edn, Palgrave 
Macmillan 2011); Jonathan Schwartz, ‘Shifting Power Relations: State-ENGO relations in China’ in 
André Laliberté and Marc Lanteigne (eds), The Chinese Party­State in the 21st Century: Adaptation 
and the Reinvention of Legitimacy (Routledge 2008) examines the environmental costs of rapid 
economic growth in China and the implications of the government’s turn towards civil society 
(environmental non-governmental organizations) to help control environmental degradation.  
19 The plenum decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee endorsed the idea 
behind the scientific development concept which was stated to be “tak[ing] people as the main thing 
[yiren weiben], establish a concept of comprehensive, coordinated, sustainable development, and 
promote comprehensive economic, social and human development”. This statement has been used by 
the Chinese media to represent the essence of Hu’s scientific development concept; Joseph Fewsmith, 
‘Promoting the Scientific Development Concept’ (2004) No. 11 China Leadership Monitor, Hoover 
Institution (Stanford University) 
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/6226> accessed 25 November 
2011. For an official summary of the Scientific Development concept, see Renming Wang, ‘Ke xue fa 
zhan guan: xian dai hua jian shi de zhong yao zhi da shi xiang’, (People’s Net,9 January 2006) 
<http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/4008564.html> accessed 25 November 2011. 
20 Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 103.   
21 See discussion in Part II below. The term ‘Two Chinas’ is borrowed from Daniel Abebe & Jonathan 
 
Tackling soaring energy consumption and improving energy efficiency are in 
tandem with the Chinese leadership’s economic priorities because there is a strong 
business case for more economical use of such valuable resources. Since 2003, 
Chinese authorities have framed climate change as predominantly an energy issue.22 
First, energy security has always been a key concern for the Chinese leadership; these 
concerns intensified in 2003 when China became the world’s second largest consumer 
of oil and the volatile oil prices in the 2000s increased the sense of vulnerability that 
Chinese dependence on imported oil engendered.23 A country with abundant coal 
reserves (the third largest known reserves in the world), China became a net importer 
of coal in 2009 from countries such as Indonesia and Australia when inefficiencies in 
the domestic coal market rendered imported coal prices competitive with domestic 
coal prices.24 Beijing’s concerns about relying on imported energy intensified as 
international criticism of China’s energy thirst grew.25 Secondly, reducing energy 
consumption and energy intensity (measured as energy consumption per unit of GDP) 
are viewed by the Chinese government as key aspects of a sustainable long-term 
energy policy that addresses both energy security and the inevitable rise in 
                                                                                                                                            
S. Masur, ‘International Agreements, Internal Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The “Two Chinas” 
Problem’ (2010) 50(2) Virginia Journal of International Law 325-389 in which the authors argue that 
the economic disparities between the East and the West of China and the consequent policy imperative 
for the Chinese government to narrow the East-West gap for reasons of political stability and national 
security profoundly affects China’s incentive structure and willingness to join an international climate 
change agreement that features mandatory emissions reduction targets. See Barry J. Naughton, ‘The 
Western Development Program’ in Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang (eds), Holding China Together 
(Cambridge University Press 2004) for the government programme to address, inter alia, poverty, low 
literary rates and environmental problems in the Western part of China to strengthen national unity and 
reduce regional inequalities within the country. 
22 Dongsheng Zang, ‘From Environment to Energy: China’s Reconceptualization of Climate Change’ 
(2009-2010) 27 Wisconsin International Law Journal 543, 562. 
23 Ibid, 564. 
24 Richard Balme, ‘China’s Climate Change Policy: Governing at the Core of Globalization’ (2011) 5(1) 
Carbon and Climate Law Review 46. 
25 See, for example, International Crisis Group, China’s Thirst for Oil (Asia Report No. 153, 9 June 
2008), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/153_china_s_thirst_for_oil.pdf> 
accessed 25 November 2011; Sarah Arnott, ‘Fears of Chinese Land Grab as Beijing’s Billions Buy Up 
Resources’,The Independent (UK, 2 October 2010). 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/fears-of-chinese-land-grab-as-beijings-billions-buy-up
-resources-2095451.html> accessed 24 November 2011.  
international pressure on China to curb GHG emissions.26 These ideas found their 
way into the National Climate Change Programme (NCCP), which lays out China’s 
blueprint for tackling climate change.  
 
The National Climate Change Programme  
 
The NCCP is a comprehensive document that sets out the principles to guide 
China’s domestic and international climate policy, mitigation and adaptation measures, 
and an institutional framework to implement the policies outlined in the Programme.27    
China’s policies on climate change, both domestic and international, are officially 
guided by six principles: (1) to address climate change within the broader framework 
of the country’s national sustainable development strategy; (2) to follow the principle 
of common-but-differentiated responsibility; (3) to address both climate change 
mitigation and adaptation; (4) to integrate climate change-related policies with 
programs for national and social economic development; (5) to rely on technological 
advancement for effectively mitigating and adapting to climate change; and (6) to 
actively and extensively participate in international cooperation on climate change.28 
Harris argues that these principles clearly indicate that climate change is taken 
seriously, but also that it does not take priority over China’s other national economic 
objectives.29 Therefore: 
[i]f climate change mitigation and adaptation can be made consistent 
with those objectives, China will act forthrightly. If advantages for 
development and other objectives can be rung from the climate change 
issue, China will exploit them, e .g., in extracting funding and technology 
for both economic development and GHG mitigation.30  
 
The mitigation measures proposed in the NCCP focus on energy conservation 
and ‘energy structure optimization’, while adaptation will be carried out through 
projects aimed at ecosystem protection, disaster prevention, and reduction and 
infrastructure development.31 The NCCP elaborates that ‘optimizing the energy 
consumption structure’ will include measures such as rapid development of renewable 
                                                 
26 Supra note 22, 567. 
27 See NCCP, 29 for institutional framework. 
28 Section 3.2 of the NCCP.  
29 Paul G. Harris, “China and Climate Change: From Copenhagen to Cancun” (2010) 40 
Environmental Law Report 10858, 10859. 
30 Ibid. 
31 NCCP, 24. 
energy (the target is to raise the proportion of renewable energy in China’s primary 
energy supply up to 10% by 2010), nuclear power and increasing extraction of coal 
bed methane (up to ten billion cubic meters).32 It also includes a program to improve 
energy efficiency in China’s largest 1000 enterprises, retiring inefficient power and 
industrial plants, energy efficiency standards for buildings, and vehicle fuel 
consumption standards.33 Finally, by placing climate change policy within the 
jurisdiction of the NDRC, one of the most powerful Chinese governmental bodies 
with a key focus on economic policy and energy policy (through its National Energy 
Administration), the government has sent a clear signal that climate change is, above 
all, an economic/energy issue rather than one concerning the environment per se.34 In 
short, the NCCP ‘provides for the implementation of a wide range of energy and 
industrial policies that, while focused on energy security, contribute to emissions 
reductions’.35  
 
Energy and Climate Change in the Five Year Plans  
 
A legacy of its communist ideological roots, the CCP has continued to roll out 
five-year plans to coordinate national policy goals, and in recent years climate change 
and energy policy issues have begun to be incorporated into these plans. An energy 
intensity target (reduction by 20% in five years) was set in the Eleventh Five-Year 
Plan (2006-2010).36 Greater attention has been paid to climate change in the Twelfth 
                                                 
32 Ibid, 26. 
33 See ZhongXiang Zhang, ‘China in the transition to a low-carbon economy’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 
6638. 6639-6641 for discussion of these measures. Studies have shown that the shut-down of obsolete 
and inefficient plants and the energy efficiency program for China’s Top 1000 enterprises were 
responsible for the success in reducing energy intensity and meeting the target set in the 11th Five-Year 
plan; Deborah Seligsohn, ‘The Transformation of China’s Energy System: Challenges and 
Opportunities’, Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
U.S. House of Representatives, 4 April 2011, page 6.  
34 Tseming Yang, ‘The Implementation Challenge of Mitigating China’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions’, 
(2008) 20 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 688. 
35 Department of Energy and Climate Change, ‘Stars and Dragons: The EU and China- European 
Committee’ (UK, 7 May 2009) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/76/76we06.htm> accessed 1 
October 2011.  
36 Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, ‘Facts and figures: China’s main targets for 2006-2010’ 
(6 March 2006) <http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-03/06/content_219504.htm> accessed 1 October 
2011. The term “Guidelines” (规划) has been used in place of “ Plan”(计划) for the above-mentioned 
Five-Year Plan (2011-2015). Targets that are congruent with the three commitments 
that China made at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) Copenhagen and Cancun conferences in 2009 and 2010 respectively can 
be found in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan: (1) The five-year carbon intensity reduction 
goal is 17%; (2) the 2015 non-fossil fuel goal is set to reach 11.4% of China’s total 
energy mix; and (3) the 2015 forest goals are to increase forest cover by 12.5 million 
hectares and forest stock volume by 600 million cubic meters.37  
 
Despite its rapid shift to a market-based economy in recent years, administrative 
plans remain an integral part of China’s system of governance, and this extends to 
environmental governance. Plans may be local or national in scope, and focused on a 
specific policy area or be comprehensive in scope. Plans are as important as laws or 
may even be considered more important, practically speaking, because statutes and 
other legal instruments tend to be rather general without details about specific goals 
and methods of implementation.38 Plans with target requirements, however, are 
adhered to by government agencies and officials by integration of such requirements 
into the cadre system (which is discussed below). It is a matter of debate if plans are 
the result of bargaining amongst agencies at the central and local levels of 
                                                                                                                                            
Five-Year programs to reflect the transition from a Soviet-style planned economy to a more 
market-oriented model but the latter term remains in popular usage and therefore has been adopted in 
this chapter; see Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, ‘The new 11th Five-Year Guidelines’, (9 
November 2005) <http://www.gov.cn/english/2005-11/09/content_247198.htm> accessed 1 October 
2011. 
37 Deng Shasha, ‘Key targets of China’s 12th five-year plan’, Xinhua News Agency (Beijing 5 March 
2011) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/05/c_13762230.htm> accessed 3 
November 2011; also see Deborah Seligsohn and Angel Hsu, ‘How Does China’s 12th Five-Year Plan 
Address Energy and the Environment?’ (The Network for Climate and Energy Information, 7 March 
2011). 
<http://www.chinafaqs.org/blog-posts/how-does-chinas-12th-five-year-plan-address-energy-and-enviro
nment> accessed 1 October 2011. 
38 William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, ‘The Limits of the Law in Addressing China's Environmental 
Dilemma’, in Michael B. McElroy et al. (eds), Energizing China: Reconciling Environmental 
Protection and Economic Growth (Harvard University Press 1998); Mol and Carter argue that the 
failure to adhere to the law carries less serious consequences than failure to carry out administrative 
programs and plans. Many environmental clean-up programs are also, for example, not based on legal 
obligations but are carried out because of administrative decisions taken by superiors; Arthur P.J. Mol 
& Neil T. Carter, ‘China’s Environmental Governance in Transition’ (2006) 15(2) Environmental 
Politics 149, 157. 
government or are ultimately directives from Beijing to lower-level entities, as 
empirical studies suggest that both phenomena are at play.39 Interestingly, the 
recently amended Energy Conservation Law explicitly refers to the use of the cadre 
system, linking plans and laws in a way that is not found in earlier legislation.40 
Article 6 of the Energy Conservation Law states that the State will implement a 
system of accountability for energy conservation targets and a system for performance 
evaluation whereby the fulfilment of energy conservation targets will be part of the 
evaluation of local governments and “other responsible persons” (which arguably 
include, inter alia, village leaders, private enterprises, and government-linked 
companies).41 The next section examines the role of local authorities in achieving 
these targets.  
 
Part II: The Role of Local Government 
 
It is difficult to generalise when provinces across China face different challenges 
posed by climate change, have very different levels of financial resources and degrees 
of political will to address environmental issues. However, a common chord is that the 
top-down deployment of the cadre responsibility system has been instrumental in 
galvanising local government action on climate change which historically has not 
been a priority. The new emphasis placed by the central government on achieving the 
short-term energy intensity target in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan also led to the 
central government focusing on the closure of energy-inefficient and obsolete 
industrial facilities and power plants.42 Again, local governments were given targets 
                                                 
39 See Michael T. Rock, ‘Integrating Environmental and Economic Policy Making in China and 
Taiwan’ (2002) 45 American Behavioral Scientist 1435-1455; Dan Guttman and Song Yaqin, ‘Making 
central-local relations work: Comparing America and China environmental governance systems’ (2007) 
1(4) Frontiers of Environmental Science and Engineering in China 418-433. 
40 The amended Energy Conservation Law took effect on 1 April 2008. The 2008 Law on the 
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution also uses the cadre system to create incentives for local 
officials to enforce national water quality standards. It has been argued that the use of the cadre system 
to address water pollution signals a move towards a political rather than legal solution and will further 
centralize the power of the Chinese Communist Party, limit transparency and public participation in 
environmental governance; Wyatt F. Golding, ‘Incentives for Change: China’s Cadre System Applied 
to Water Quality’ (2011) 20 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 399-428. 
41中华人民共和国节约能源法 (Law of the People’s Republic of China on Energy Conservation). The 
original wording of Article 6 is as follows: 第六条 国家实行节能目标责任制和节能考核评价制
度，将节能目标完成情况作为对地方人民政府及其负责人考核评价的内容。 
42 Dongsheng Zang, ‘Green from Above: Climate Change, New Developmental Strategy, and 
to close down a specific number of facilities in their jurisdictions. Therefore, by 
framing climate change as an energy issue and using the cadre system, the central 
government has placed climate change on the agenda of local governments. In 
addition to these mandated targets for action, authorities have provided financial 
incentives for local action towards reducing energy consumption, improving energy 
efficiency and closing down obsolete industrial facilities.  
 
In China, there are four levels of government below the central government: 
provincial, prefectural, county, and township.43 Provincial level governments are 
first-level state administrative organs of the 23 provinces, five autonomous regions, 
four provincial-level municipalities, and two special administrative regions (SARs).44 
The official view is that “[p]rovincial governments implement local laws, regulations 
and decisions of the provincial people’s congresses and their standing committees, are 
responsible to and report on their work to provincial people’s congresses and their 
standing committees. Provincial people’s congresses and their standing committees 
have the power to supervise the work of provincial governments, change and annul 
inappropriate decisions of the provincial governments. Provincial governments have 
the power to exercise unified leadership over the work of governments at the levels of 
the cities, counties, townships and towns under their jurisdiction and to exercise 
unified administration over economic, social and cultural affairs”.45 Furthermore, 
Article 3 of the Constitution states “[a]ll administrative, judicial and procuratorial 
organs of the state are created by the people's congresses to which they are 
responsible and by which they are supervised”. However, this arrangement is not akin 
to the “checks and balances” and “separation of power” model of government found 
in democracies. In a socialist regime, the role of people’s congresses or legislatures is 
not to check executive power but to implement executive proposals “with minimal 
change or opposition”.46 While electoral reforms introduced in the late 1970s and still 
underway have decentralised the legislative system and introduced a degree of 
openness in the electoral system, it can be argued that the electoral reforms have only 
entrenched, and not weaken, Party rule.47  
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43 Article 30 of the Constitution sets out the administrative institutional framework.  
44 China Internet Information Center, ‘China’s Political System’, (Central People’s Government 
website) <http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/28842.htm> accessed 29 November 2011. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Kevin J. O'Brien, Reform without liberalization: China's National People's Congress and the 
politics of institutional change (Cambridge University Press 1990), 74. 
47 Ying Sun, ‘Constraining or Entrenching the Party-state? The Role of Local People's Congresses in 
 
This chapter will focus on the provincial and prefectural levels of local 
government, but will exclude consideration of the SARs, Hong Kong and Macau, 
because the social, political and economic conditions in these localities are vastly 
different from those of mainland China due to the legacy of colonialism.48  
 
The Cadre System   
 
 The cadre system is the instrument used by the central government to steer local 
leaders and by which it holds them accountable.49 As a method of governance, it is 
the primary means of controlling and monitoring the actions of roughly 60 million 
state employees and is therefore a key source of political control of the CCP. The 
cadre administration, most commonly found in communist systems, is a distinct form 
of administration marked by its emphasis on goals and its flexible nature. It has been 
argued that the cadre system is highly sensitive to the changing preferences of 
political leaders who can use this mighty administrative system to work for new 
policy goals.50  
 
Under the cadre system, the performance of local officials and heads of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is reviewed against targets laid down by higher levels 
and the evaluation has significant bearing on promotion and future job prospects. 
Failure to perform up to par can lead to dismissal or demotion in certain cases.51 
While local governments have significant leeway in deciding how they will meet 
centrally imposed targets, such flexibility being necessary to formulate policies that 
are suited to local conditions, and there is also more than a grain of truth in the ancient 
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Chinese proverb “Heaven and the Emperor are far away”, the cadre system has been 
instrumental in increasing state capacity to monitor and control lower-level officials.52 
Traditionally, performance criteria consisted mainly of economic growth targets.53 
The recent inclusion of environmental and energy targets in the target responsibility 
system has been instrumental in motivating local government officials to act on 
climate change.54 Otherwise, the incentives are stacked against local action on 
climate change as there are no rewards for climate action and the prevailing 
perception is that reducing GHG emissions and energy consumption will thwart 
economic growth. 
 
   In the case of climate change, the national energy intensity target set out in the 
Five-Year Plan was disaggregated into provincial targets, taking into account targets 
proposed by the provinces in their own provincial Five-Year Plans, and submitted by 
the NDRC to the State Council for approval.55 Once the State Council approved the 
NDRC’s plan, provincial governments were required to re-allocate the targets to the 
city and county level, as well as to industrial sectors and major enterprises.56 Targets 
are commonly inflated for lower levels of government in Chinese policy campaigns. 
This practice of hedging stems from the upper-level government anticipating some 
degree of failure of local efforts. For example, in Shanxi, the targets assigned by the 
provincial government were raised for municipalities, counties, and enterprises to 
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ensure achievement of the overall provincial target.57 In one municipality, targets at 
the county level ranged from a 27 percent to 30 percent reduction in energy 
intensity.58 
 
Institutionally, shortly after the establishment of the National Leading Group on 
Climate Change (NLGCC), Provincial Leading Groups on Climate Change were 
formed. Between June 2007 and March 2008, eight provinces and autonomous 
regions created leading groups.59 Hainan Province, for example, formed a provincial 
leading group within days of the NLGCC and developed the Hainan Provincial Work 
Plan on Energy Saving and Pollution Reduction. This Work Plan was disseminated to 
all agencies and lower level governments. Its accompanying cover letter stated that 
the mission of the leading group was to ensure implementation of the national climate 
policy, and design and carry out provincial-level action plans on climate change, 
energy saving, and pollution reduction. Finally, prefectural and county governments 
were required to establish their own leading groups with similar functions. Provincial 
climate change plans were also drawn up.60  
 
Factors Influencing Local Government Action  
 
The promulgation of action plans and establishment of working groups are 
formalities that do not inform us about the institutional capacity and factors of 
political economy that influence the willingness and ability of provincial and 
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prefectural governments to meet the energy intensity targets and, more broadly, 
engage in addressing climate change. To meet the energy intensity targets, the realistic 
option for many local governments, especially those of provinces and towns that are 
highly dependant on pollution and energy-intensive economic activity such as coal 
mining, is to shut down older and small-scale plants. However, such a course of action 
has significant ramifications for local tax revenues, GDP growth, employment and 
social stability. These factors weigh far more heavily on local government officials 
than climate change, which is perceived as a large-scale global problem that is the 
proper concern of national authorities and beyond the abilities of local government. 
This section examines these factors before turning to consider, on a more optimistic 
note, the creative strategies that local government officials have used to align national 
objectives with local priorities.  
 
Perception of climate change as a “global issue” and not the “business” of local 
governments 
 
The central government’s strategy of addressing climate change has conflated the 
issues of energy saving, pollution reduction and climate change, but local 
governments tend to attach very different degrees of importance to each of these 
issues.61 Local governments are concerned about energy saving, first and foremost, 
because intensive energy use increases costs of production and economic growth. 
Pollution usually ranks second. While public protests have occasionally forced local 
authorities to curb flagrant violations of environmental laws and clean up major 
environmental disasters, tackling pollution is generally a low priority for them 
because it implies investment in costly technology and slowing down local economic 
growth when factories are forced to close.62 Even if there is the local will to act, 
environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) at the local level are commonly 
under-resourced and relatively powerless vis-à-vis their economic counterparts, as 
discussed in the abundant literature on the “implementation gap” in Chinese 
environmental law.63 
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‘Poison Protests’, The Economist, (Beijing, 20 August 2011) 
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Finally, climate change as a policy concern is a distant last, being perceived as an 
issue of little practical relevance for local governments. Climate change is seen as an 
international issue driven by external pressure and therefore the purview of the central 
government.64 In addition, local governments do not face pressure from their 
constituencies to address climate change. There is dismally low level of awareness 
about climate change amongst the general population, while employment and issues 
of survival are foremost concerns for the ordinary folk. A case study on Beijing, 
which is one of the most modern Chinese cities with a high concentration of human 
capital and tertiary institutions, reported that simple online and street surveys showed 
the public knew very little about climate change and often confused climate change 
with air pollution.65 Ye and others argue that the recent realization by local 
governments of the link between energy saving and climate change, together with the 
dictates of the central government, has helped to ‘translate the global issue of climate 
change into a local priority’.66 However, this ‘priority’ has only been in relation to 
climate mitigation (from energy efficiency measures) rather than climate adaptation.  
 
Taxation System 
 
A new tax-sharing system between the central government and local 
governments was introduced in China in 1994. This fiscal system has been criticised 
for creating incentives for local governments to focus on economic growth at the 
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expense of environmental protection.67 Taxes are grouped into three categories: 
revenue for the central government, revenue for local governments, and revenues 
shared by both tiers of government. Taxes that are easily raised from relatively steady 
sources, such as the vehicle purchase tax and consumption tax, are assigned to the 
central government.68 Income tax and value-added tax (VAT) are shared – the local 
government receives 25% of VAT and 40% of income tax.69 The revenues collected 
from the business, agricultural and resources taxes (except taxes paid by maritime 
companies and petroleum companies that are collected centrally), and the real estate 
and construction taxes, belong to the local governments.70 
 
The introduction of the tax-sharing system increased the central government’s 
revenue by 200% in 1994 relative to the previous year, and its proportion of total tax 
revenues grew from 22% in 1993 to 55.7% in 1994.71 Meanwhile, its share of total 
government expenditure only rose by 2%. By 2008, local governments received 47% 
of total tax revenues but were responsible for 78.7% of total government 
expenditure.72 Local governments therefore have an incentive to focus on local 
economic development to enlarge their taxation base in order to finance education, 
healthcare, public transportation, and so on. As discussed below, local governments 
have had to craft creative solutions based on bargaining and informal incentives to 
meet their energy targets without overly hindering local development. 
 
Capacity 
 
Chinese local government officials operate in a cultural/social context that 
emphasises hierarchy, order, knowing (and adhering) to one’s place in the scheme of 
things.73 This tradition perhaps originated from the influence of Confucian 
philosophy on Chinese society, which emphasise the importance of conformity to 
one’s role in a hierarchy (‘[T]he emperor should act like an emperor; an officer should 
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act like an officer; a father should act like a father; and a son should act like a son’) 
and this phenomenon of blind obedience to the superior has been labelled ‘political 
level decides all’ (fan zheng zhi hua).74 The cadre system reinforces this 
cultural/social predilection for conformity and respect for hierarchy.  
 
 In such a hierarchical system, the capacity of local governments to act is 
constrained by the level of local autonomy. Traditionally, climate change has been 
viewed as a central government concern, in which local governments must implement 
the policies and regulations set by their superiors. Local government officials have 
hesitated to become involved when they receive signals that their involvement is not 
welcome. As for policy innovation to address climate change, the political sensitivity 
of this issue makes local governments feel that it is politically astute to align with 
national policy rather than to act unilaterally.75  
 
 Financial capacity is another pressing issue. Compared to the rest of the country, 
the Western provinces such as Qinghai, Gansu and Xinjiang face more climate change 
challenges such as the prospect of melting glaciers and severe changes in weather 
patterns. However, they are also far poorer than the Eastern provinces and have 
comparatively less capacity for adaptation.76 In addition, the lack of awareness of the 
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urgency of the problem amongst local government officials is a factor behind sluggish 
policy responses to climate change.  
 
Creative Strategies to Overcome Constraints  
 
Despite these constraints, some local governments have successfully met or even 
exceeded their energy intensity targets while others have resorted to blunt and 
unsustainable policies that have hurt local livelihoods.77 These latter policies were 
clearly implemented only to meet targets, without real consideration for addressing 
climate change. According to media reports, the city of Wenzhou in Zhejiang 
Province introduced a unique, but blunt energy-saving policy: every four days, 
businesses and factories were required to turn off their electricity supply for an entire 
day.78 Local residents were, of course, been frustrated and angry at these rather crude 
and desperate measures, which were introduced in the final year of the Eleventh 
five-year plan to meet the energy targets.   
 
Kostka and Hobbs, based on their fieldwork in Shanxi province (a major 
coal-producing and energy intensive province), suggest that the local governments 
there succeeded in meeting energy targets by ‘bundling’ energy objectives with the 
interests of groups with significant influence and ‘bundling’ energy efficiency with 
policies of more pressing local importance.  
 
The former strategy involves local government officials aligning their interests 
with those of SOEs and large private companies by communicating the importance of 
the energy-saving policy and indicating the willingness of local authorities to provide 
compensatory benefits to enterprises that comply.79 These benefits include assurance 
of preferential access to land and capital. The bargaining process, of course, is flexible 
and different tactics of appeasement or pressure are used to ensure that the enterprises 
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agree to undertake measures that will allow the officials to meet their targets.80 The 
managers of SOEs and private enterprises respond to different types of incentives. 
The managers of SOEs are easier to convince because they themselves are likely to be 
subjected to similar energy targets under the cadre system and will be punished during 
their performance evaluation if they fail to meet their energy goals. Furthermore, SOE 
managers are motivated by prospects of promotion to politically prestigious positions. 
Kostka and Hobbs note, for example, that ‘it is common knowledge among Shanxi 
enterprise managers that the former head of the largest iron and steel plant in Shanxi, 
Taiyuan Iron and Steel, was promoted to deputy governor of the province after 
increasing efficiency and raising production standards at the company’.81 
Private-sector managers, on the other hand, respond less to political incentives and 
more to factors such as increased market share due to consolidation of production 
capacity in the hands of the most efficient companies. They are also concerned about 
maintaining access to capital from local banks, which commonly align loan decisions 
with the interests or directions of local mayors and party secretaries.82  
  
An example of the latter strategy is the framing of the Shanxi Top 1000 
Enterprise Program (a provincial-level version of the National Top 1000 Enterprise 
Program) and the policy of closing small and inefficient industrial plants as part of 
programs aimed at upgrading production capacity and economic restructuring.83 This 
approach is also used to subtly sell the idea that energy saving policies lead to social 
benefits in the long run, such as employment creation and enhanced workplace 
safety.84 By shifting production capacity from small or under-performing enterprises 
to large, efficient enterprises that can boost economic growth with higher energy 
efficiency, socially disruptive consequences can ensue.85 Such effects cannot be 
adequately explored in this chapter, but it would be important to carry out further 
research on the consequences of local government policies in the name of energy 
saving and climate change.  
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Part III: Clean Development Mechanism  
 
Background 
 
The CDM has taken off in an impressive manner in China, which has emerged as 
the world’s largest supplier of CDM carbon credits (known as Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CERs)). As of 17 October 2011, the country hosted to 1626 registered 
CDM projects, which accounted for 46% of the total number of registered projects 
worldwide.86 This positive performance of the CDM in China can be attributed to the 
capacity-building projects funded by multilateral banks and donor countries to raise 
awareness and develop technical expertise, the central government’s well-designed 
regulatory process for CDM project approval, as well as the concerted efforts to raise 
the level of awareness and interest in the CDM amongst local governments.87  
 
Before the Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005, a major study by the World 
Bank, the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology, and two bilateral donors, was 
conducted to identify the potential size of the Chinese CDM market and the 
opportunities and barriers to developing this potential market. A key barrier that was 
identified was that ‘the central government is knowledgeable about CDM, but there is 
relatively little awareness of CDM at the provincial and local levels’.88 Hence, the 
recommendation was to promote the CDM in provinces and cities that have been 
identified as having significant potential for such projects through workshops, training 
courses and establishing a roundtable to develop shared expertise from on-going pilot 
CDM projects.89  
 
The first CDM provincial centres opened in 2004. Their primary function is to 
raise local awareness about the CDM, particularly in China’s western and 
underdeveloped regions, where the central government wishes to see more investment 
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in energy infrastructure.90 These centres reach out to project owners via governmental 
channels. While CDM project approval remains in the ambit of the central 
government, provincial CDM centres help to disseminate information and serve as a 
crucial contact point, at least initially, between Chinese project developers and foreign 
CER buyers.91  
 
Local Governments Respond Positively  
 
Provincial governments have responded to the CDM with the enthusiasm of 
profit-oriented enterprises.92 The CDM has been an attractive new source of revenue 
for local governments and has provided incentives for investment in renewable energy 
projects (particularly in hydro and wind power). Zhang argues, for example, that the 
CDM has been an important driver behind wind power expansion in China.93 The 
wind power tariffs (as determined by the central government) are considered to be too 
low to generate much interest in developing wind projects. By registering a wind 
project under the CDM, the sale of CERs can boost the internal rate of return by 
6-20% in comparison to wind power projects undertaken outside the CDM 
framework.94  
 
What is unique about the nature of Chinese local government involvement in the 
CDM is (1) that the local governments are owners of the CDM projects (ie, they are 
project developers) and not just acting as facilitators of project transactions between 
buyers and sellers of CERs; and (2) the majority of CDM projects are owned by local 
governments. This arrangement is primarily the result of the Chinese rule that permits 
only companies that have at least 51% Chinese ownership to carry out CDM projects. 
Article 11 of the Measures for Operation and Management of Clean Development 
Projects in China states ‘Chinese funded or Chinese-holding enterprises within the 
territory of China are eligible to conduct CDM projects with foreign partners’. Thus, 
municipal enterprises (controlled and supervised by local governments) own 
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two-thirds of all registered CDM projects in China.95 SOEs own 27% and the private 
sector owns about 5% of registered Chinese CDM projects respectively.96 These 
figures highlight the entrepreneurial spirit of local governments – while they may be 
labouring under the ‘iron hand’ to implement their energy targets, they are also quick 
to recognise business opportunities created by the burgeoning green economy. Once 
again, it is salient to note that local governments are not investing in CDM projects 
because they are keen to address climate change per se, but because the CDM is a 
revenue generator. To the extent that the CDM allows the local government to claim 
that it is improving its environmental performance and promoting climate mitigation, 
the climate aspect is an ancillary motivation for local authorities. The next section 
provides an overview of the distribution of CDM projects across provinces. This 
information gives interesting insights into the most popular types of CDM projects 
and how the provincial distribution is likely to change over time.  
 
Provincial Distribution of Projects 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Provincial Distribution of Currently Registered CDM Projects and 
Cumulative CERs Expected by 201297 
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Figure 2: Types of Registered CDM Projects in China98 
 
 
 
 
CDM projects occur in almost every Chinese province, with Yunnan, Inner Mongolia 
and Gansu, the poorest provinces on a per capita GDP basis, hosting the largest 
number of CDM projects. Yunnan, with the highest number of these projects, has a 
strong emphasis on hydropower development because of its rich riparian resources. 
Inner Mongolia ranks third in terms of number of projects and is a leader in wind 
power development in China. The first CDM project in China is the Huitengxile wind 
farm project located in Huitengxile, Inner Mongolia, with a total wind power capacity 
of about 34.5 megawatts.99 Shanxi ranks fourth in terms of the volume of CERs 
generated by CDM projects in its province and is a leader in coal bed methane 
development.  
 
 It is clear from Figure 2 above that renewable energy projects (wind and hydro) 
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dominate the Chinese CDM portfolio, but Figure 1 shows a sharp discrepancy 
between the number of projects and the volume of CERs produced by each province. 
Yunnan may host the highest number of CDM projects, but Zhejiang, Jiangsu and 
Shandong produce the most CERs by a large margin. The high volume of CERs 
produced by these three provinces is attributable to their hosting HFC-23 destruction 
projects. The 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP) of HFC-23, which is 
generated as a by-product of manufacturing hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC)-22 
(used as a refrigerant or as a feedstock in Teflon manufacture), is 11,700. Thus, under 
the rules of the CDM which converts the other six Kyoto Protocol regulated gases to 
carbon dioxide, and hence CERs based on their GWPs, a ton of HFC-23 abated is 
considered equivalent to 11700 tons of carbon dioxide.100 The sale of CERs has led to 
greater wealth for these already-prosperous Eastern provinces. However, as HFC-23 
projects are few and as more renewable energy projects start issuing CERs, a more 
balanced distribution of the volume of CERs created across provinces should ensue.101 
 
 It is interesting to note that the CDM has not played a significant role in helping 
local governments meet their energy efficiency targets. The lack of viable CDM 
methodologies, the difficulties of calculating emissions reductions, determining 
additionality, project boundaries and applicable baselines, have been cited as the main 
reasons for the relatively meager contribution of energy saving and efficiency CDM 
projects.102 In addition, most projects are small or mid-sized in nature and generate an 
uncertain and limited number of CERs.103 Local governments are therefore less keen 
to implement them. However, this picture may change as relatively lower transaction 
costs for projects become possible from implementing new methodologies and 
undertaking CDM projects on a more comprehensive, program-wide basis.  
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Part IV: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to provide an insight into the forms, dynamics and 
incentives that shape climate governance in China. The central government plays a 
key role in shaping policy and issuing directives that are then implemented by local 
governments. Local government officials respond to the directives to address climate 
change, reduce energy consumption and improve energy efficiency because these 
directives are translated into mandatory targets that determine their career path, 
salaries and political prospects.  
 
Faced with diverse priorities and incentives, local governments tend to place 
economic development ahead of environmental protection while climate change is a 
rather nebulous concept with no tangible policy implications at least in the short-term. 
Hence, it garners little attention from local officials. However, faced with mandatory 
targets, local government officials have crafted creative solutions to encourage energy 
saving as they navigate a politically complex terrain. Finally, in line with their profit 
orientation, local governments have embraced the CDM as a novel source of revenue 
and a means of crucial financial support for renewable energy projects in poorer 
provinces.  
 
The introduction of a cap-and-trade carbon trading scheme in China, similar to 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), has been on the 
government’s agenda.104 Anecdotal evidence has it that officials from Beijing and 
major cities like Shanghai and Guangdong have been visiting Brussels to gain a better 
understanding of the EU ETS and to draw lessons for China’s experiment with 
domestic carbon trading.105 On 23 November 2011, the state news agency (Xinhua) 
reported that the NDRC has given the green light for a pilot GHG emissions trading 
scheme in seven provinces to test its feasibility for deployment across the country.106 
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Details such as how the scheme will work and how long it will last are not available, to the best of the 
These developments will increase the involvement of local governments and 
corporations in climate mitigation but will have limited impact on changing the 
prevalent social indifference to climate change and the need for adaptation. 
Capacity-building efforts should therefore focus on education and awareness-raising 
of all sectors of society, but particularly the current generation of young Chinese who 
will be responsible for determining whether China becomes a massive polluter and 
energy consumer or a success story of sustainable development in the twenty-first 
century.  
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